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JUDGMENTS - DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS - UsE IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - A mining company, subject to the Fair Labor Standards·
Act,1 brought an action against the United States District Attorney for Idaho
for a declaratory judgment that it was not subject to threatened criminal prosecu-

1

52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 201.
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tions and penalties under the act. The company had not included the forty
minutes allowed for lunch in estimating the number of hours worked by its
employees. The employees and their labor union threatened to sue, claiming the
lunch period was part of their working hours and that they were therefore to
that extent required to work overtime without extra pay. The Department of
Labor and the Department of Justice threatened to enforce criminal penalties
for violations of the act. On motion to dismiss, held, that the motion should
be overruled because an actual substantial controversy within the meaning of
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act 2 was presented. Sunshine Mining Co.
v. Carver, (D. C. Idaho, 1940) 34 F. Supp. 274.
The passage of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act opened to litigants
in the federal courts 8 a practical method of determining disputes without
recourse to the coercive processes, thereby substituting a peaceful method of
determining rights between parties for the old contentious actions at law or in
equity which were available only after injuries had been committed or threatened and often aroused long-standing animosities. 4 The lower federal courts at
first disagreed as to the right of a petitioner under the terms of the act to obtain
a declaration of his nonliability under a given set of circumstances, a few cases 5
holding that a determination of "rights" did not include 6 a decision of that

2 "(1) In cases of actual controversy ••• the courts of the United States shall
have power • • • to declare rights and other legal relations of any interested party
petitioning for such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be prayed,
and such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree••••"
Judicial Code, § 274d, 48 Stat. L. 955 (1934), as amended by 49 Stat. L. 1027
(1935), 28 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 400.
8
For a discussion of the scope of the declaratory judgment under state statutes,
see: Sunderland, "The Types of Controversies in Which Declaratory Judgments Have
Been Rendered," 4 M1cH. Jumc1AL CoUNcIL REPORTS, appendix I (1934); Borchard, ''Recent Developments in Declaratory Relief," IO TEMP. L. Q. 233 (1936);
Borchard, "Declaratory Judgments, 1939," 9 BROOKLYN L. REV. I (1939).
'36 M1cH. L. REv. 466 (1938). For discussions of the history and theory of
the declaratory judgment, see: Sunderland, "A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights,
-The Declaratory Judgment," 16 M1cH. L. REv. 69 (1917); Borchard, "The Declaratory Judgment in the United States," 37 W. VA. L. Q. 127 (1931); BoRCHARD,
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934); Borchard, "The Federal Declaratory Judgments
Act," 21 VA. L. REV. 35 (1934).
11
Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Foulke, (D. C. Mo. 1936) 13 F. Supp. 350,
reversed (C. C. .A. 8th, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 261 (note 7, infra); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. London, (D. C. Mass. 1936) 15 F. Supp. 586.
6
Professor Borchard has always argued against this view: "The action for a socalled negative declaration is simply a broadening of the equitable action for the
removal of a cloud from title to cover the removal of clouds from legal relations generally•••• The importance of the power to sue on the part of an endangered or
potentially endangered or disputed possessor of rights is that judicial protection may
be obtained before the danger has ripened into catastrophe and before the other party
has commenced suit to enforce his claims." BoRCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
19 (1934).
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nature. However, the contrary view 7 was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth. 8 The principal case illustrates a further
extention of this interpretation of the act by pointing out a method whereby a
person threatened with criminal penalties 9 under a federal regulatory statute can
determine the applicability of the statute without running the risk of actually incurring penalties by deliberately violating the regulations. The Fair Labor
Standards Act provides a maximum number of hours for a work week but it
does not state whether th.e lunch period should be considered in computing the
number of working hours.10 In the face of this uncertainty as to his legal position and the threat of prosecution for violation of the act, the employer in the
principal case was permitted to have his liability in respect to the alleged violations determined without running the risk of pecuniary loss or punishment in
case of an adverse decision in a criminal prosecution. As a matter of policy the
decision is to be approved. As regulatory statutes continue to increase in number,
the individual's freedom of action is proportionately diminished; he is compelled more and more to act in accordance with statutory restrictions, which
are usually enforced by penalties.11 Private rights can be more adequately protected by a speedy adjudication of the meaning and applicability of a regulation
than by a criminal prosecution.12 The limitations on the use of the Declaratory
Judgment Act as a method of statutory interpretation are not entirely clear.
The types of cases in which a declaratory judgment could possibly be given
have been classified 18 as (I) cases in which wrongs have been committed and
damage already incurred, (2) controversies in which irreparable injury is impending, (3) cases where a real dispute exists but no rights have been impaired
or injury threatened, and (4) cases which are moot in that no dispute exists
and the litigant merely desires an advisory opinion.14 There would seem to be no
justifiable reason for excluding class three.15 A "substantial controversy'' may
7 Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Plummer, (D. C. Tex. 1935) 13 F. Supp. 169;
Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, (D. C. Tex. 1935) 13 F. Supp. 174;
Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Foulke, (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 261.
8
300 U. S. 227, 57 S. Ct. 461 (1937).
9 Declaratory judgments of the validity, construction, and application of criminal
statutes have generally been permitted under state declaratory judgment statutes. See
:innotation in l 29 A. L. R. 7 51 ( l 940).
1
°Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. L. 1063, § 7 (1938), 29 U.S. C.
(Supp. 1939), § 207.
11
BoRcHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 341-342 (1934); Sawyer, "Law and
Practice in Aid of Industrial Individualism," 9 GEo. WASH. L. REV. l (1940).
12
BoRCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 561-562 (1934), and cases cited.
18 See Schroth, "The 'Actual Controversy' in Declaratory Actions," 20 CoRN.
L. Q. l at 20 (1934); notes in 49 HARv. L. REv. 1351 (1936) and 15 N. Y. UNIV.
L. Q. REV. 266 (1938).
14 Courts have uniformly refused to decide this type of case because no judicial
controversy exists within the meaning of constitutional provisions. Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 250 (19II); United States v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297,
29 S. Ct. 507 (1909).
16
United States v. West Virginia, 295 U. S. 463, 55 S. Ct. 789 (1935);
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 56 S. Ct. 466· (1936).
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exist even though no damage has been done and no danger immediately impends.16 An actual dispute between two parties which has not yet reached the
"battle" stage nevertheless could be decided by the use of the declaratory judgment advantageously to both sides. Moreover, while the declaratory judgment
is only an alternative remedy when it is used in the first two classes of cases, it
is the sole means of determining controversies of the third type.
Reid J. Hatfield

16 State courts have little difficulty in applying declaratory actions to this type of
controversy: Morton v. Pacific Construction Co., 36 Ariz. 97, 283 P. 281 (1929)
(interpretation of contract); Post v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 227 App. Div. 156,
237 N. Y. S. 64 (1929), affirmed in 254 N. Y. 541, 173 N. E. 857 (1930)
(interpretation of contract); Colver v. Miller, 127 Kan. 72, 272 P. 106 ( 1928)
(construction of a deed); Ohio-Kentucky Coal Co. v. Auxier, 239 Ky. 442, 39 S. W.
(2d) 662 (1931) (interpretation of a lease).

